Cognitive ergonomics for data analysis. Experimental study of cognitive limitations in a data-based judgement task by Kalakoski, Virpi et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tbit20
Behaviour & Information Technology
ISSN: 0144-929X (Print) 1362-3001 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tbit20
Cognitive ergonomics for data analysis.
Experimental study of cognitive limitations in a
data-based judgement task
Virpi Kalakoski, Andreas Henelius, Emilia Oikarinen, Antti Ukkonen & Kai
Puolamäki
To cite this article: Virpi Kalakoski, Andreas Henelius, Emilia Oikarinen, Antti Ukkonen & Kai
Puolamäki (2019): Cognitive ergonomics for data analysis. Experimental study of cognitive
limitations in a data-based judgement task, Behaviour & Information Technology, DOI:
10.1080/0144929X.2019.1657181
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2019.1657181
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 24 Aug 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Cognitive ergonomics for data analysis. Experimental study of cognitive
limitations in a data-based judgement task
Virpi Kalakoskia, Andreas Heneliusb, Emilia Oikarinenb, Antti Ukkonenb and Kai Puolamäkib
aFinnish Institute of Occupational Health, Helsinki, Finland; bDepartment of Computer Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
Today’s ever-increasing amount of data places new demands on cognitive ergonomics and requires
new design ideas to ensure successful human–data interaction. Our aim was to identify the
cognitive factors that must be considered when designing systems to improve decision-making
based on large amounts of data. We constructed a task that simulates the typical cognitive
demands people encounter in data analysis situations. We demonstrate some essential cognitive
limitations using a behavioural experiment with 20 participants. The studied task presented the
participants with critical and noncritical attributes that contained information on two groups of
people. They had to select the response option (group) with the higher level of critical attributes.
The results showed that accuracy of judgement decreased as the amount of information
increased, and that judgement was aﬀected by irrelevant information. Our results thus
demonstrate critical cognitive limitations when people utilise data and suggest a cognitive bias
in data-based decision-making. Therefore, when designing for cognition, we should consider the
human cognitive limitations that are manifested in a data analysis context. Furthermore, we
need general cognitive ergonomic guidelines for design that support the utilisation of data and
improve data-based decision-making.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 11 July 2019
Accepted 13 August 2019
KEYWORDS
Human–data interaction;
cognition; decision-making;
cognitive ergonomics
1. Introduction
In this era of digitalisation, humans need to increasingly
make decisions that rely on data that is analysed and
summarised by algorithms and systems. Data-based
decision-making may appear simple on the surface: sys-
tems such as search engines provide the most important
parts of the data for experts and laymen interacting with
the system to enable them to make rational decisions
based on the evidence presented. However, previous
research on human engineering has already demon-
strated that several factors related to the usability of
the system, sociotechnical context, and limitations of
human cognition aﬀect whether human–computer inter-
action is eﬀortless and error-free (Wickens, Gordon, and
Liu 2004). It is evident that the increasing amount of data
available for open usage raises similar human factor
issues, but it also raises new questions that need to be
answered to ensure successful human–data interaction
(Hibbard and Peters 2003).
Our focus is on the cognitive factors in human–data
interaction. Ergonomic (or human factors) practices
aim to ensure ‘appropriate interaction between work,
product and environment, and human needs, capabilities
and limitations’ (HFES 2019). Cognitive ergonomics is a
domain of specialisation within ergonomics that con-
cerns ‘mental processes, such as perception, memory,
reasoning, and motor response, as they aﬀect inter-
actions among humans and other elements of a system’
(IEA 2019). When studying the factors that predict suc-
cessful human–data interaction, it is important to under-
stand how the cognitive aspects of both the human and
system parts of the interaction constrain data-based
decision-making.
Although the amount of data has increased and the
methods for analysing them have advanced considerably
in recent years, the basic cognitive ability of human
beings has not developed in the same way. On the one
hand, human decision-making is still limited by, for
example, our capacity to rehearse and process infor-
mation in short-term working memory (Baddeley and
Hitch 1974; Cowan 2001), our inclination to better recall
the ﬁrst and last items from serially presented infor-
mation (Glanzer and Cunitz 1966), and the various cog-
nitive tendencies that bias our decisions (Tversky and
Kahneman 1981). On the other hand, although the
human ability to learn is exceptional, developing
expert-level knowledge and skills is time-consuming
(Ericsson and Lehmann 1996), and we seldom acquire
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exceptional or even adequate skill levels in a wide range
of domains. For example, domain experts are rarely
experts in data analysis, and they often have little kno-
whow or control of the systems used to analyse and sum-
marise their data. In sum, when studying human–data
interaction, it is important to identify relevant cognitive
functions and to apply the ﬁndings of the related exper-
imental and applied cognitive psychology studies (Kala-
koski 2016).
Moreover, to understand human–data interaction, we
also need to consider the system part of the interaction,
that is, how data systems constrain the interaction.
Although advances in computation and data analysis
make it possible to diﬀerentiate complex patterns from
large heterogeneous data sets, a query may appear funda-
mentally diﬀerent when its parameters or ﬁltering cri-
teria are changed. As a result, we live in ‘ﬁlter bubbles’
created by information-processing systems (Pariser
2011), and large parts of important, signiﬁcant or novel
views of the data may remain unnoticed. Therefore,
despite the availability of huge amounts of data, we are
not able to thoroughly utilise the information or the evi-
dence present in them. In sum, not only human cognitive
limitations, but also the factors inherent in analysing
large data sets can aﬀect the success of human–data
interaction. Our decisions may be founded on narrow
views provided by the system, which exclude the critical
factors necessary for making good, informed decisions
(Hibbard and Peters 2003).
In naturalistic data-based decision-making situations,
datasets are often complex and the problems ill-deﬁned,
that is, it is not clear if the chosen interpretation and
decision is correct. In our experimental study, we
demonstrate some cognitive phenomena that are rel-
evant to making judgements in data-based decision-
making tasks. We developed a task that represents cen-
tral cognitive demands in human–data interaction. By
manipulating the cognitive demands of the task, we
investigated which factors aﬀect decision-making task
performance. Our practical objective was to identify
the factors that need attention when aiming for cogni-
tively sound designs. The results suggest some general
guidelines for how to take cognition into account when
designing data analysis systems.
2. Decision-making in applied contexts
Decision-making has been experimentally studied using
various tasks and paradigms, and from many theoretical
approaches. Since data-based judgement requires
numerous cognitive processes, no single paradigm or
theoretical approach can identify it is as a widely recog-
nised phenomenon. However, several frameworks and
cognitive phenomena are relevant. This notion is in
line with the claim by Logie, Trawley, and Law (2011)
that, in the context of multitasking, current cognitive
theories can address speciﬁc components of the cognitive
system rather than how the system performs complex
tasks. Therefore, understanding everyday cognitive
tasks requires new paradigms and theories that can
handle various cognitive functions operating in concert
rather than in isolation (Logie, Trawley, and Law
2011). We proceed with this line of thought in our
study and, rather than studying a speciﬁc cognitive func-
tion or theoretical assumption, we aim to understand the
cognitive demands and processes that are crucial in the
applied context of data-based decision-making.
Research on decision-making in applied contexts
oﬀers an increasing number and scope of studies. The
paradigms and frameworks, however, have been devel-
oped for speciﬁc contexts and are relevant to speciﬁc
ﬁelds. For example, in the naturalistic decision-making
research approach (Klein 2008), the models and methods
apply to dynamic, continually changing conditions
under which knowledgeable people work on ill-deﬁned
goals and ill-structured tasks (Klein et al. 1993). Simi-
larly, the useful concept of situational awareness (Ends-
ley 1995) combines several cognitive functions that are
relevant in demanding dynamic tasks such as air traﬃc
control (Endsley and Rodgers 1994). However, the con-
cept and framework of this approach refer to a speciﬁc
combination of cognitive functions and task demands
and are not directly applicable to other contexts. Data-
based decision-making is a complex everyday task but
does not carry the features relevant to the above-men-
tioned frameworks of complex decision-making.
However, decision-making has also been studied in
speciﬁc contexts that are applicable in human–data
interaction. For example, the cognitive demands of
using big data are similar to cases in which the consu-
mer’s health care decisions are supported by the use of
information (Hibbard and Peters 2003) or when an audi-
tor is provided with accounting information on the econ-
omic reality of the company (Lau 2008). In these
examples, making informed decisions is a cognitively
complex task that involves several cognitive steps, such
as taking in, processing and interpreting information;
identifying, integrating, and weighting important factors;
and making trade-oﬀs and bringing relevant factors
together into a choice (Lau 2008).
The concern that an abundance of information does
not guarantee informed decisions has been recognised
in these ﬁelds (Hibbard and Peters 2003) and is highly
relevant in the context of data-based decision-making.
Everyday decisions typically concern artiﬁcially con-
structed information that combines only the aspects of
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the reality that the selected measures and signals can rep-
resent (Lau 2008). Furthermore, as only some aspects of
the information are available to the decision-maker,
these may include information that is not relevant in
the present context and exclude information that
would be essential for an informed decision (Lau
2008). Thus, the glut of information inherent in big
data poses a challenge to both systems that compute
and present information, and decision-makers who try
to diﬀerentiate between relevant and insigniﬁcant infor-
mation. Moreover, the decision-maker is seldom aware
of how the parameters of the algorithms that compute
the data aﬀect the result, nor of how human cognitive
processing biases the choices we make.
2.1. Data-based decision-making as a cognitive
task
In this study, we are interested in a general case and a
decision-making scenario in which there is large survey
data or other indicators of several variables for several
teams or groups of workers. In our scenario, the data
are used by professionals whose task is to decide, based
on the data, which one of two groups of participants is
under more cognitive load and thus require support
and actions. In fact, the practical motivation for our
study comes from real naturalistic decision-making situ-
ations in contexts in which large data sets are utilised in
organisational decision-making to improve evidence-
based management; we have noticed a need to better
understand the underlying cognitive phenomena in
order to enhance data-based decision-making.
We will focus on the ﬁrst steps in decision-making,
when information is presented, and relevant information
is identiﬁed. Three essential cognitive demands are in
focus. First, presenting data typically involves presenting
values for several attributes and subgroups. Thus, the
amount of information presented and required in every-
day decision-making easily exceeds human cognitive
capacity. Research shows a capacity limit of about three
to four items when the task requires working memory,
the essential system in any cognitively demanding task
that requires maintaining and processing information
(Cowan 2001). This cognitive limitation constrains how
humans represent and rehearse the essential features
and parameters of the data, and how much of this infor-
mation is used when making decisions and judgements
(Allred et al. 2016). Thus, the amount of information pre-
sented is a signiﬁcant factor underlying decision-making.
Furthermore, not every piece of information is rel-
evant, and the decision-maker needs to separate the rel-
evant information from the irrelevant, that is, to detect
signals from noise, as is stressed in research on
decision-making in accounting (for a review see Lau
2008). If the irrelevant information is emphasised and
the problem is falsely identiﬁed, the following phases of
decision-making, that is, generating alternative courses
of action and selecting the most appropriate one, are
based on incorrect assumptions and cannot lead to a suc-
cessful result. For example, when the problem that causes
poor proﬁtability inmanufacturing has not been correctly
identiﬁed, the next steps in decision-making do not
handle the real problem: it remains unsolved (Lau 2008).
Second, when presenting data, whether in numerical
or visual format, it is seldom possible to present all the
information simultaneously. Typically, several tables or
ﬁgures are required to, for example, present values for
diﬀerent relevant attributes in two or more groups.
Even if all the data are presented to us in one view, in
practice, we need to focus on only one aspect at a time.
Therefore, cognitive processing of the presented data
requires several steps, and the task thus consists of a
sequence of various cognitive sub-tasks. Processing
sequential information is associated with several relevant
phenomena in human cognitive functioning, including
the eﬀect of a serial order of a list item on memory recall:
the ﬁrst and last items in the list are typically recalled bet-
ter than other items, which are the primacy and recency
eﬀects, respectively (Glanzer and Cunitz 1966).
The position of information does not only aﬀect
encoding and the memory of information, but also
decision-making (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992): depend-
ing on the type of task, the items that are presented
ﬁrst or last during a session or task can be overempha-
sised and bias the judgement in a certain direction (i.e.
information order bias; Perrin et al. 2001) For example,
information order eﬀects are seen as a key factor contri-
buting to the eﬃciency and the eﬀectiveness of an audit,
as the information that is presented last is over-weighted
in the audit (Ashton and Kennedy 2002). Similarly, in
data-based decision-making, the eﬀects related to pres-
entation mode and organisation of information (Ashton
and Ashton 1990; Yang et al. 2018) may thus aﬀect the
selection of the features that truly aﬀect judgment.
Third, data-based decision-making is a speciﬁc
example of a demanding judgment task and thus likely
to be subject to the biases typical to human thinking.
Research has demonstrated that our thinking seldom fol-
lows the strictly rational paths that normative decision-
making theories describe; it is subject to many kinds of
cognitive biases. Several biases are relevant to data-
based decision-making. For example, we tend to search
for evidence to match our expectations and are likely
to rely on information that conﬁrms what we want to
see and ﬁnd (so-called conﬁrmation bias; Oswald and
Grosjean 2004). Moreover, equivalent information can
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be described or ‘framed’ in diﬀerent ways and verbalisa-
tions, which aﬀects the choices we make (Mandel 2014;
Perrin et al. 2001). Furthermore, the information pre-
sented ﬁrst can frame our decisions. For example, pre-
senting ﬁnancial measures ﬁrst anchors ratings so that
the manager with better performance in ﬁnancial
measures is rated higher but if the non-ﬁnancial measure
is presented ﬁrst, the managers who excel in these
measures get higher ratings (Neumann, Roberts, and
Cauvin 2011). In data-based decision-making, it is thus
essential to be aware of the relevant cognitive biases that
are ongoing when we look for relevant features: we may
be more prone to conﬁrming our prior expectations or
our ﬁrst impression of the data rather than utilising the
new and unexpected information hidden within it.
2.2. Aim of the study
In our experimental study, we demonstrated cognitive
phenomena that are relevant to making judgements in
data-based decision-making tasks and that need atten-
tion when aiming for cognitively sound designs. We
developed a type of task that represents the general cog-
nitive demands of a data-based decision-making case
and allows its systematic study. Our research questions
addressed whether data-based decision-making is
aﬀected by the amount of information presented, and
to what extent cognitive biases manifest in data-based
decision-making.
3. Methods
The Ethics Committee of the Finnish Institute of Occu-
pational Health has granted approval for this study.
3.1. Participants
The participants were 20 volunteers who were informed
that participation required normal or corrected to normal
vision, basic experience in using computers, Finnish as a
native language, and no cognitive limitations or medi-
cations that could aﬀect performance. Fourteen partici-
pants reported being women, six reported being men or
other, and all but one participant reported being right-
handed. The participants’ age varied between 18 and 49,
and the 18–29, 30–39, and 40–49 age groups had 14, 3,
and 3 participants, respectively. They gave their informed
consent, and received a 20 € gift card after the session.
3.2. Material
We created a new judgement task for the experiment.
The task allowed manipulation of (i) the amount of
presented information (length of a stimulus sequence,
that is, the number of items within a sequence), (ii) the
serial order of presented stimuli (position in a sequence),
(iii) the diﬃculty of the decision-making task (unam-
biguous vs. ambiguous stimulus sets), and (iv) the role
of background information (values for stimulus attri-
butes deﬁned as information irrelevant to the task).
3.2.1. Stimuli and stimulus sequences
The stimuli consisted of three critical target attributes
and three noncritical background attributes associated
with numbers between 1 and 10, which described the
level of attribute prevalence in Group A and Group B.
A single stimulus is a three-element tuple of the form
S = (attribute, score A, score B). Here, the attribute was a
word, and the attribute scores were numbers between 1
and 10, describing the prevalence of the attribute for
two groups, Group A and Group B. For example, the
attribute ‘disruptions’ could have a score of 6 in Group
A and a score of 8 in Group B, indicating a higher preva-
lence in Group B.
The attribute was one of two types: either a critical
target attribute or a non-critical background attribute.
Three target attributes and three background attributes
were Finnish words with two to four syllables. The criti-
cal target attributes were related to workload and
referred to disruptions, time pressure, and information
overload (in Finnish: häiriöt, kiire, tietotulva), whereas
the noncritical background attributes were neutral or
related to the alleviation of workload and referred to
team work, breaks and learning (tiimityö, tauot, oppimi-
nen). The stimuli were assembled as S sequences includ-
ing multiple stimuli with one, two or three critical and
noncritical attributes (see Figure 1 for an example of a
single stimulus and a stimulus sequence).
The sequences belonged to either of two ambiguity
categories, depending on the total accumulated score
for the critical target attributes in the sequence. In an
unambiguous sequence, the total accumulated critical
attribute in the sequence was greater for either Group
A or B, that is, it was clear whether Group A or B had
a higher workload. The group with the higher total accu-
mulated score was the ‘correct’ choice. In an ambiguous
sequence, the total accumulated critical attribute score
was the same for both groups, that is, both choices
were equally valid. The total accumulated score for the
background attributes was always unambiguous and
thus either supported or did not support either Group
A or B. For example, if the background attributes sup-
ported correct response A in unambiguous sequences
or the selection of Group A in ambiguous sequences,
the total score for background attributes was lower for
Group A than for Group B. If the background attributes
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did not support correct response A in unambiguous
sequences or the selection of Group A in ambiguous
sequences, the total score for background attributes
was higher for Group A than for Group B. The rationale
was therefore that a higher total accumulated score for
the critical target attributes reﬂected more workload,
whereas a higher score for non-critical background attri-
butes could be interpreted as reﬂecting less workload.
We generated sets that had (i) an equal number of
stimulus sequences of length 2, 4, and 6, (ii) an equal
number of unambiguous and ambiguous sequences for
each sequence length, (iii) an approximately even fre-
quency for each attribute, (iv) attributes that each
appeared in all positions for each sequence length, (v)
all maximum diﬀerence values (0, 1, 2, 3) present for
the critical attributes, and maximum diﬀerence values
(1, 2, 3) present for the background attributes. Each par-
ticipant was tasked with completing at least four sets
with 48 sequences each (altogether 192 sequences). A
detailed description of how the ambiguous and unam-
biguous sequences and stimulus sets were constructed
is available on request.
3.3. Procedure
The stimulus sequences were presented to the partici-
pants on a computer screen. Before each stimulus, a
ﬁxation dot was shown for 500 ms, after which the
stimulus was shown for 3000 ms. After the last stimulus
in the sequence, the response screen was visible until the
participant pressed one of the reply keys (‘F’ for Group A
and ‘J’ for Group B), or for a maximum time of 5000 ms.
The participant’s selection was highlighted for 500 ms.
After this, the process was repeated for the next stimulus
sequence (Figure 2).
We instructed the participants to determine whether
Group A or Group B had a higher level of workload,
based on the values for the presented critical attributes
only. The response was given by pressing the ‘F’ key
with the left-hand index ﬁnger for Group A and the ‘J’
key with the right-hand index ﬁnger for Group
B. Participants were instructed to respond quickly and
correctly. There was a brief pause after each set (48
sequences) and a 5–10-minute pause after two sets.
Each of the 20 participants were tasked with completing
at least four sets, and the presentation order of the sets
was circularly shifted and balanced between the partici-
pants. The participants were tested individually or in
groups of two to four. The session took 90–110 min
and included background questions, practice trials,
instructions, and a brief interview at the end of the
session.
4. Results
The independent variables were (i) the amount of pre-
sented information (length of a stimulus sequence, that
is, the number of items within a sequence), (ii) the
Figure 1. Example of ambiguous stimulus sequence with four single stimuli. The actual stimuli were in Finnish.
Figure 2. Presentation of stimulus sequences. The stimulus block was repeated 2, 4 or 6 times depending on the number of stimuli in
the sequence. After all the stimuli in a sequence had been presented, the response block was shown. After the response block, the
process was repeated for the next stimulus sequence.
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diﬃculty of the decision-making task (unambiguous vs.
ambiguous stimulus sets), and (iii) the role of back-
ground information (values for stimulus attributes
deﬁned as information irrelevant to the task). The
dependent variables were the mean response time and
the percentage of correct replies. We studied the eﬀects
of the Amount of Presented Information (2, 4, or 6
stimuli in a set), the Task Diﬃculty (unambiguous or
ambiguous stimulus set), and the role of the Background
Information Support (irrelevant stimulus attribute values
supporting or weakening the correct response). The
dependent variables were the percentage of correct
answers (Figure 3 left panel), the mean response times
in the judgement task (Figure 3 right panel), and the dis-
tribution of the frequency of the diﬀerent responses
(Table 1).
We conducted a two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA to reveal the eﬀects of Amount of Information
and Background Support on the percentage of correct
responses in unambiguous tasks. The Task Diﬃculty fac-
tor, that is, the ambiguous stimulus sets, were omitted in
this analysis, as there was no correct response. The
results showed the signiﬁcant main eﬀects of Amount
of Information, F(2,16) = 10.26, p < .01, h2p = .56 and
Background Support, F(1,17) = 5.66, p < .05, h2p = .25.
The interaction between the main eﬀects was not signiﬁ-
cant, F(2,16) = 0.36, h2p = .04. The results thus show that
the level of correct responses decreased as the amount of
information increased. Furthermore, the level of correct
responses was higher if the non-critical background
information supported rather than conﬂicted with the
correct response based on the critical target information.
We conducted a three-way repeated-measures
ANOVA to reveal the eﬀects of Amount of Information,
Background Support, and Task Diﬃculty on the
response times. All the main eﬀects were signiﬁcant, F
(2,17) = 14.84, p < .001, h2p = .64; F(1,18) = 16.18, p
< .01, h2p = .47; and F(1,18) = 7.42 p < .05, h
2
p = .29,
respectively. Furthermore, the two-way interaction
eﬀects between Amount of Information and Background
Support, F(2,17) = 4.50, p < .05, h2p = .35 and Task
Diﬃculty and Background Support, F(1,18) = 5.71, p
< .05, h2p = .24 were signiﬁcant, whereas the interaction
between Amount of Information and Task Diﬃculty
was not signiﬁcant, F(2,17) = 2.84, h2p = .25. The three-
way interaction between all the main factors was signiﬁ-
cant, F(2,17) = 4.95, p < .05, h2p = .37. Altogether, these
results showed that response times were shorter when
non-critical background information supported rather
than conﬂicted with critical target information, and the
eﬀect of background information was stronger with
more diﬃcult tasks, that is, in ambiguous cases. The
response time pattern also showed that the higher the
amount of information, the shorter the response times.
This result may be related to the decision-making task
design: the amount of information presented and the
presentation time were confounded. When the task con-
tained more information (i.e. six attributes rather than
two), the time to serially present this information also
increased, oﬀering more time to process the task before
the response was required (response times were
Figure 3. Percentage of correct response (left panel) and mean response time (right panel) for non-critical background information
support in relation to task diﬃculty (unambiguous vs ambiguous critical target attributes) and amount of information (number of
attributes)
Table 1. Frequency of actual responses A or B (Actual Response)
by which response background supported stimulus sets with
correct reply A or B (non-ambiguous) or either reply
(ambiguous). Stimulus set length was 2.
Background supports (actual
response) Total
Correct reply for stimulus set A (A) A (B) B (A) B (B)
A
Observed frequency 142a 9b 137c 28b 316
Expected values 100.0 52.1 57.4 106.6
Residual 42.0 −43.1 79.6 −78.6
B
Observed frequency 21a 117b 13a 163c 314
Expected values 99.4 51.8 57.0 105.9
Residual −78.4 65.2 −44.0 57.1
Either (ambiguous)
Observed frequency 217a 72b 68b 214a 571
Expected values 180.7 94.1 103.6 192.6
Residual 36.3 −22.1 −35.6 21.4
Total
Observed frequency 380 198 218 405 1201
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of categories whose column pro-
portions did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from each other at the .05 level.
6 V. KALAKOSKI ET AL.
calculated from the time point at which all the infor-
mation was presented).
A chi-square test was conducted to reveal whether the
distribution of response categories (background supports
A or B * Actual response is A or B) diﬀered within three
stimulus types: correct response A (non-ambiguous
sequences), correct response B (non-ambiguous
sequences), or no correct response (ambiguous
sequences). We analysed Post Hoc cell contributions at
a level of p < .05 to determine whether any of the four
response types was especially characteristic of some
stimulus type. Table 1 presents the observed frequencies,
expected values, and residuals for the response categories
in stimulus set length 2. The results showed that the
diﬀerence between the observed and the expected error
distributions diﬀered in all stimulus set lengths, i.e.
two, four and six stimuli in a set, χ2(6) = 457.7, p
< .001, χ2(6) = 457.7, p < .001, χ2(6) = 457.7, p < .001,
respectively. Post hoc cell contributions revealed that if
there was no correct reply in the task (ambiguous
sequences) but the background features supported
response A, participants used response category A
more often than expected, and a similar pattern was evi-
dent for features supporting Group B. However, if the
background attribute values did not support the speciﬁc
response category, it was less frequent than expected.
Moreover, this eﬀect of background attribute values
increasing the frequency of selecting the group sup-
ported by the background attribute values and decreas-
ing the frequency of selecting the group that was not
supported by background values was evident even in
the distribution of responses for stimulus sets that were
not ambiguous but had a correct response option.
5. Discussion
In our study, we focused on the cognitive factors relevant
to making judgements in data-based decision-making
tasks. The main ﬁndings were that (i) the response accu-
racy in data-based decision-making decreases when the
amount of information increases and (ii) irrelevant
information aﬀects judgement. The results thus indicate,
in the context of data-based decision-making, that cogni-
tive demands exceeding working memory capacity
impair task performance (Cowan 2001) and that judge-
ment is subject to cognitive biases, such as being framed
by inessential information (Hibbard and Peters 2003;
Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
The results showed that response accuracy decreases
when the amount of information increases, such as with
longer stimulus sets. In our study, the fall in accuracy of
judgement was clear when the number of critical and
non-critical attributes increased from one to three items,
that is, from two to six relevant and irrelevant attributes
presented as task information. This sounds like quite a
modest amount of information, and yet it overburdens
human decision-makers and leads to incorrect responses.
Our results indicate that a large amount of information
does not automatically lead to improved judgement (Hib-
bard and Peters 2003), but limited human cognitive
capacity is a true constraint for utilising data, as for any
cognitive task requiring maintaining and processing
information in the working memory (Cowan 2001).
Our results also showed that in the case of equivalent
alternatives with no correct choice, participants tended
to use noncritical background information in judgement.
That is, they did not randomly select one of the two
equally invalid response options but tended to select
the option based on irrelevant attributes. This tendency
was present in even non-ambiguous tasks; if an incorrect
response option was selected, it tended to be the one sup-
ported by the background attribute information. Thus, in
this data-based decision-making task, participants
seemed to interpret irrelevant background attributes as
factors that buﬀer against the critical attributes. This
result indicates, in the context of data-based decision-
making, a cognitive bias in which judgement is aﬀected
by non-essential information. It seems that irrelevant
attributes can ‘frame’ the problem (Mandel 2014; Perrin
et al. 2001) and anchor the choice (Neumann, Roberts,
and Cauvin 2011). Our results thus suggest that irrele-
vant information in the data can lead to incorrect
assumptions, hinder the handling of the real problem,
and thus disrupt the selection of the appropriate further
action (Lau 2008).
The contribution of our study is that we demonstrate
how general cognitive limitations constrain the utilis-
ation of data. Although the task used in this study was
a simpliﬁed version of any naturalistic case, it neverthe-
less comprised cognitive demands relevant in any situ-
ation in which people utilise data. In our study, we
thus chose to prioritise a task and method that reﬂect
the basic cognitive processes underlying data-based
decision making rather than one speciﬁc ecologically
valid task. We admit that both approaches to science
are essential; the dimension of the ecological validity of
method, and the dimension of generalisability of the
conclusions. Nevertheless, we endorse the view that
when it’s diﬃcult to gain both, it is more important to
ensure generalisability of the principles rather than the
exact operationalisations (Banaji and Crowder 1989;
Fiske and Borgida 2011). Since the methodology of our
study enables us to focus on well-known and general
cognitive processes operational in data-based decision-
making tasks in the laboratory, we argue that the results
also generalise to naturalistic contexts where these same
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Crowder 1989). Therefore, the cognitive limitations
demonstrated in our experiment show generalisable
principles relevant to any case of data-based judgement.
Our cognitive ergonomics approach is not based on
one single cognitive theory, but on various theoretical fra-
meworks and numerous ﬁndings of cognitive psychology;
this approach nevertheless advances the understanding of
the factors that predict performance in cognitively com-
plex tasks. However, in future studies, it is important to
demonstrate the principles we have studied also with
other data-based decision-making tasks. Furthermore, it
is important to expand the external validity of our results
by including cognitive and other variables outside the
scope of our study. For example, the level of expertise is
known to substantially aﬀect cognitive task performance
(Ericsson and Lehmann 1996). In the context of data
based decision making, an interesting question would
be how expertise in the subject domain, and on the
other hand, in data analysis systems, would aﬀect data-
based judgement. Furthermore, there are various other
relevant cognitive principles that were outside the scope
of our study, but would provide useful information,
such as principles of visual processing that generalise
and are relevant to the design of displays presenting data.
Our aim was to understand the basic cognitive limit-
ations and general cognitive task demands essential in
the context of human-data interaction. This approach
lies between earlier studies that concentrate on speciﬁc
cognitive functions in a speciﬁc task and with appli-
cation-driven methodology, such as the priming and
anchoring eﬀects in the context of visual analytics systems
(Cho et al. 2017; Valdez, Zieﬂe, and Sedlmair 2018), and
studies that investigate decision-making in naturalistic,
knowledge-rich contexts that involve speciﬁc cognitive
task demands and use a large-scale, context-related
approach (Endsley 1995; Klein 2008). We claim that our
approach can provide results that go beyond speciﬁc
tasks and speciﬁc contexts. In the future, it is important
to develop theories for applied cognitive psychology
that address how the human cognitive system is able to
perform well in any cognitively demanding task (Logie,
Trawley, and Law 2011); for example, how the uniﬁed
human cognitive system functions, with all its limitations
and various information processing components, when
we eﬃciently utilise data in decision-making tasks.
5.1. Cognitive ergonomics for data analyses
The cognitive phenomena demonstrated in our exper-
imental study suggest principles that require attention
when we aim to improve the quality of data-based
decisions. Advances in digitalisation and computation
can also provide new means that enable designing cogni-
tion friendly systems. Human-data interaction happens
when people use applications to ﬁnd meaningful infor-
mation in the data. It would be useful to utilise data on
human behaviour in this context in a similar way to
which the data obtained when people use search engines
to navigate in the internet is utilised. In human-data
interaction, technical systems can help identify speciﬁc
limitations and compensate for the limited human cog-
nitive capacities that impair our ability to eﬃciently uti-
lise data. They can also adapt to users’ biases and present
and target data in a way that supports informed choice
(Valdez, Zieﬂe, and Sedlmair 2018).
First, when designing systems, we need to ﬁnd ways in
which to organise information and reduce users’ cogni-
tive burden (Hibbard and Peters 2003). A good cognitive
ergonomic principle is to support the encoding of a valid
picture of the situation by, for example, shortening the
sequences when presenting information or by support-
ing representation construction if several stages and
sub-processes are required when interpreting the data
(Hibbard and Peters 2003; Yang et al. 2018). A clever
sequential presentation system would decrease cognitive
load in situations that require the creation of a mental
model of a vast amount of data. Moreover, since the
presentation order of information matters, technical sys-
tems can model its eﬀect and weigh the information that
is underrepresented. Thus, a technical system would be
able to computationally correct the human tendency to
rely more on information that is presented ﬁrst or last.
Second, cognitively sound systems should communi-
cate to the user those aspects of the data that are mean-
ingful in the speciﬁc context. On the one hand, the
system should be able to help the user identify and
weigh the information that is relevant to the choice by,
for example, drawing attention to speciﬁc attributes or
outcomes by framing them (Hibbard and Peters 2003).
On the other hand, the system could make human
decision-makers aware that their decisions may be
framed by incidental attributes which lead them to lean
towards a decision that is based on unimportant aspects
of the data.
Human–data interaction systems provide objective
behavioural data that can be more useful in enhancing
decision-making than subjective user preferences which
do not necessarily correlate with how well the infor-
mation can be utilised in decision-making (Hibbard
and Peters 2003). Results concerning response times
and correct responses in well-deﬁned contexts and con-
trolled tasks, such as our experiment, can provide refer-
ence patterns for comparison when interpreting data
obtained in more complex cases. For example, our results
showed longer response times in ambiguous cases when
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the selected response conﬂicted with the non-critical
background information. This result suggests that select-
ing a response even if the situation is unclear and a gen-
eral response pattern would predict another response,
may be comparable to incorrect choices. In behavioural
sciences, a typical response and reaction time pattern
shows longer responses for incorrect than for correct
decisions. Using behavioural data to identify ‘outliers’
in response patterns can be developed for a technical sol-
ution that recognises when human decision-makers need
more support to improve the quality of their decisions.
In sum, good cognitive ergonomics of design should
at least (i) support the encoding of the reality of the situ-
ation by, for example, shortening the sequences when
presenting information; (ii) enhance representation con-
struction if several stages and subprocesses are required
when presenting the data using, for example, a clever
sequential presentation system; (iii) support ways of
communicating which aspects of the data are considered
meaningful to the user in the speciﬁc context; and (iv)
make the human decision-maker aware of incidental
attributes that may frame their decisions and cause
them to lean towards unimportant aspects of the data.
We hope that our cognitive ergonomics approach will
inspire future research. The results of our study need to
be expanded in order to demonstrate the variety of cog-
nitive demands relevant to data-based decision-making
contexts. Research and design should utilise the vast
amount of knowledge cognitive psychology already pro-
vides and explicitly deﬁne how the general limitations of
the human cognitive system manifest when humans uti-
lise data. With evidence-based and cognitively sound
design, human–data interaction systems can develop
information presentation techniques that facilitate
encoding and utilising a larger amount of data than
that which would be possible for the limited human cog-
nitive system without support.
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